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COMMENTS

tiff brought his wife and week-old baby to the defendant hospital. Nine
days later the wife died and plaintiff left the baby at the hospital until he
became settled, being assured that for $1.00 per day the child would
receive the best of care. At about this time, the daughter of one Vlemminck gave birth to a child at the hospital, the result of an incestuous
relationship between her and her father. She too left her baby at the hospital. Vlemminck came for the child and was given plaintiff's baby by
accident. Later the mistake was discovered but Vlemminck claimed that
he had given the baby to strangers passing through the city. The child
was never recovered and there was strong suspicion that Vlemminck had
disposed of the baby. Plaintiff was not allowed to recover from the hospital either in tort or in contract.
Can we reasonably say that the father felt he was leaving his child in
one nurse's care? Is it not more logical to say that he left the baby under
the care of the hospital? Here is a case involving extreme mental anguish,
and yet immunity of a so called charitable institution prevented any
recovery. Natural justice and the moral law seem to be considerably outweighed by "immunity." But this is not an exceptional case. It is the
general rule in a large number of states. Fortunately, as has been stated,
the trend today is away from immunity and towards liability. It is to be
hoped that our courts will soon rid themselves of this doctrine completely, so that eventually we may say that in the American legal system, for
every wrong that occurs, there is an existing legal remedy.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
Generally, there is privileged communication between a client and his
attorney relevant to matters about which the attorney is giving legal
advice. This is found in early common law by virtue of a theory that
the attorney by his oath and honor would not divulge the secrets of
his client. Under this theory the attorney had the ability to waive the
privilege if his conscience would permit. Over the years this theory was
weakened by the courts, and by the last quarter of the 1700's was entirely repudiated.'
By the time this doctrine was repudiated, however, a new theory had
found its way into the thinking of the courts to justify the same general rule. It was said that the privilege belonged not to the attorney, but
to the client. It is important during litigation for the attorney to know
all of the facts so that he might better protect the interests of his client.
If the client were to believe that his statements to his attorney could be
I Wigmore, Evidence, § 2290 (3d ed., 1940).
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used in court against him, he would tell the attorney only the things most
favorable to himself and would not say anything that might hurt his
position in court. The courts recognize that the ordinary individual needs
the advice of an attorney and can not depend upon his own knowledge
to protect his interests in court. If there were no privilege, the individual
skilled in law would be in a better position to protect his own interests
in court than one without legal training. He would not need to divulge
to anyone, who could testify against him, any facts which would not be
to his best advantage.
As Justice Jessel explained:
The object and meaning of the rule is this: That as, by reason of the complexity and difficulty of our law, litigation can only be properly conducted by

professional men, it is absolutely necessary that a man, in order to prosecute
his rights or to defend himself from an improper claim, should have recourse

to the assistance of professional lawers, and it being so absolutely necessary, it
is equally necessary, to use a vulgar phrase, that he should be able to make a
clean breast of it to the gentleman whom he consults with a view to the prosecution of his claim, or the substantiating against the claim of others; that he
should be able to place unrestricted and unbounded confidence in the professional agent, and that the communications he so makes to him should be kept
secret, unless with his consent (for it is his privilege, and not the privilege of
the, confidential agent), that he should 2be enabled properly to conduct his liti-

gation. That is the meaning of the rule.

At first, communications made during litigation concerning that litigation only were privileged. Under the new theory the rule was extended
to include communications made during other litigation, then those made
in contemplation of litigation, until the privilege was granted for any
consultation for legal advice even with no litigation in mind.a
The general rule is recognized by the courts and has seldom been
questioned. The main argument against the privilege is that, when it is
used in criminal cases, it only benefits the guilty and that there is no
reason to set up obstructions which will allow the guilty to escape the
punishment they deserve; and even if the privilege were abolished, the
basic rights of the individual would not be taken away.4 The courts have
taken the attitude that the greater good is obtained by allowing the
privilege. However, since the privilege results in the exclusion of evidence
and also at times in an incomplete disclosure of facts, the rule of the
privilege concerning communication for legal advice has been strictly
construed by the courts. 5
2

Anderson v. Bank, [1876] L.R. 2 Ch. D. 644, 649.

3Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (3d ed., 1940).
4 Bentharn, Rational of Judicial Evidence, b. IX, pt. IV, c. 5 (Bowring's ed., 1827,
vol. VII, pp. 474 ff.).
5 Peoples Bank v. Brown, 112 Fed. 652 (C.A. 3rd, 1902).
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For the privilege to apply there must be an attorney-client relationship
or the communication must be made with a view to employment of
the attorney. 6 Of course it is not necessary that the attorney charge a
fee for the attorney-client relationship to exist,7 but a casual request for
an opinion as to the law will not of itself give rise to the relationship.8
It does not mean that the client himself need be the one to pay the fee,
but just that the attorney is receiving compensation for his advice.
The attorney must be employed in his capacity as an attorney. Where
the attorney is merely requested to draw up a deed and no legal advice
is asked or given, there is no privilege since he is acting only as a conveyancer. 9 The privilege will extend to agents of the attorney such as a
12
secretary or a clerk,' ° but not to an attorney-in-fact" or a law student.
The attorney must be admitted to practice before the bar in the jurisdiction to which the client belongs or the communication must be concerning the law of the jurisdiction where the attorney has been admitted.13 The client is entitled to some peace of mind. Therefore when he
has used due care in ascertaining whether the individual he consults
is an attorney who comes under the privilege, the privilege will exist even
14
if the individual is not an attorney.
The communication must be made in confidence, and it must be relevant and material to the matter with which the consultation is concerned. 15 This does not mean that it can be concerning only the things
necessary for the attorney to know for the individual case, since the
client does not know exactly what is relevant and what is not. The main
test seems to be whether the statement is made as a part of the purpose
of the client to obtain advice on that subject.16 No actual request for
secrecy is needed for the privilege to exist, and no pledge of secrecy
7
will extend the privilege beyond its usual limits.'

Since the confidential relationship must exist while the client is communicating with the attorney, generally it will not be deemed privileged
6

Keir v. State, 152 Fla. 389, 11 So. 2d 886 (1943).

7 Robinson v. U.S., 144 F. 2d 392 (C.A. 6th, 1944).

8 Goltra v. Wolcott, 14 111.89 (1852).
9 U.S. v. De Vasto, 52 F. 2d 26 (C.A. 2d, 1931).
10 State v. Krich, 123 N.J.L. 519, 9 A. 2d 803 (1939).

"1State v. Smith, 138 N.C. 700, 50 S.E. 859 (1905).
12 Holman v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 555 (1850).
13 Lawrence v. Campbell, 4 Drew 485, 62 E.R. 186 (Ch., 1859).
14 People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N.W. 539 (1886).
15 Modem Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F. 2d 352 (C.A. 5th, 1942).
16 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2310 (3rd ed., 1940).
17 McLellan v. Longfellow, 32 Me. 494 (1851).
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if it is stated while a third party is present.' 8 An exception to this arises
when the third party is an agent for the attorney (stenographer or
clerk) 19 or a confidential agent of the client.20 If the communication is
to be related to someone else later, it is not considered confidential and
therefore no privilege attaches to it.21
A problem presents itself when the attorney is acting for another
party who has an interest in the case. If the attorney is acting for two
people who are parties on the same side of a case, communications made
by one of the parties while the other one is present will still be privileged,
except when the parties are opposing each other in a later action. 22 When
a client divulges information to his attorney, or to an attorney in contemplation of employment to represent him in a certain matter and there
already exists an attorney-client relationship between the attorney and
the opposing party, the privilege will still exist unless the individual who
made the communication knew that the attorney was representing the
23
opposing party against his interest.
Since it is not always possible for the attorney and client to confer
personally, the privilege is extended to communications made by the
agent of the client under his authority when there is good reason for
using an intermediary. 24 The necessity of this rule can easily be seen
where the client is a corporation. Likewise, a communication made
through the attorney's clerk as his agent is also considered privileged. 25
The privilege exists for the benefit of the client. Therefore, the attorney cannot testify as to the privileged communications whether he is
willing or not. 20 The client cannot be required to testify as to the communications. 2r Even though the attorney and the client cannot be required to testify concerning the communications, the client may waive
the privilege. Generally, it is not necessary that the waiver be explicitly
stated by the client at the trial. There may be a general waiver before
18

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 36 Mich. 502 (1877).

19 State v. Krich, 123 N.J.L. 519, 9 A. 2d 803 (1939).
20

In re Busse's Estate, 332 Il. App. 258, 75 N.E. 2d 36 (1947).
Hill v. Hill, 106 Colo. 492, 107 P. 2d 597 (1940).
22 Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F. 2d 823 (C.A. 6th,
1941).
21

23Wigmore,
24 Webb

25 Barnes
26

Evidence, § 2312 (3rd ed., 1940).

v. Lewald Coal Co., 214 Cal. 182, 4 P. 2d 532 (1931).

v. Harris, 7 Cush. 576 (Mass., 1851).

Koontz v. Owens, 109 Mo. 1, 18 S.W. 928 (1892); Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y.

394 (1880).
27

State v. White, 19 Kan. 445 (1887).
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the trial.2 8 The mere statement by the client that he has no objection to
the attorney testifying will not constitute a waiver, however.
If the client calls his attorney to the stand and asks questions concerning the communications, he is waiving the privilege and the attorney
can be cross-examined about the conversation in question.2 9 Once the
client has waived the privilege at the trial, he cannot assert it later in
the proceedings.30
When the client has the attorney act as a subscribing witness to a
document, the privilege is waived and the attorney may be required to
testify as to its execution, consideration, and other pertinent details of
the transaction. 31 Likewise, when an attorney is a2 witness to a will, the
testator is deemed to have waived the privilege.3
When the client dies, the privilege remains; and the attorney is not
allowed to reveal the communications. 33 However, just as the client can
waive the privilege, the executor or administrator of the client can waive
34
it in his place to the extent that he succeeds to the decedent's interest.
In a suit between a third person and the heirs of the client, only the
heirs can waive the privilege.35 However, in a suit contesting a will, the
privilege is of no practical value as some jurisdictions say that it is then
non-existent"6 while others hold either party may waive it.3
Although all the requirements might be present to give rise to the
privilege, there will be no privilege when the client consults the attorney
with a view to using the information for fraudulent or criminal activities.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo said in obiter in Clark v. United States:3 s "The
privilege takes flight if the relation is abused. A client who consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud
will have no help from the law." 9
There is no question of an existing privilege when the attorney and
the client conspire for fraudulent purposes. However, it is not necessary
28

Phillips v. Chase, 201 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755 (1909).

29

Bloumont v. Kimpton, 155 Mass. 378, 29 N.E. 590 (1892).

30

Green v. Crapo, 181 Mass. 55, 62 N.E. 956 (1902).

31

Larson v. Dahlstrom, 214 Minn. 304, 8 N.W. 2d 48 (1943).

32

Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666, 21 N.W. 2d 914 (1946).

33

Baldwin v. Com'r. of Int. Rev., 125 F. 2d 812 (C.A. 9th, 1942).

34

Brooks v. Holden, 175 Mass. 137, 55 N.E. 802 (1900).

35

Winters v. Winters, 102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W. 184 (1897).
Wilkinson v. Service, 249 Ill. 146, 94 N.E. 50 (1911).

36
37

Winters v. Winters, 102 Ia. 53, 71 N.W. 184 (1897).
38 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
39

Ibid., at 15.
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that the attorney know of the purpose of the communication. 40 He may
be innocent of any wrong and there still will be no privilege for the
client.
In one instance where the attorney acted for his client over a period
of one year, during which time he had more than two hundred conferences with the client who was considered a notorious gambler in his
community, the privilege was held not to exist since the probable reason
for the conferences must have been to further the criminal intentions
41
of the client.
In order for the attorney to be required to testify on the basis that
there was a criminal or fraudulent purpose involved, a prima facie case,
showing that the communication probably concerned acts which came
within this exception, must be established.4 2 In all cases it is the court,
and not the attorney, who ultimately decides whether the privilege is
applicable.43 The attorney can merely state the privilege exists, but if
the court finds that under the circumstances it does not, he must testify.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation 44 the Court
succinctly summed up the general rule:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or

sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in

connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
45
client.

Although some states have adopted statutes recognizing this rule, the
courts have generally interpreted them to be merely codifications of the
common law. 46 Even though it would seem at times that an individual
might escape justice by hiding behind the privilege, it would seem to
be far more important for every individual to be able to have his interests properly represented. The individual should be able to receive
the aid he needs without having to feel that what he tells his attorney
will be repeated or publicized later. The law has recognized this need
and the courts have been careful throughout the years to uphold the
right of the privilege and protect the client's communications.
Regina v. Cox, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 153.
In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 105 A. 2d 395 (1954).
42State v. Childers, 196 La. 554, 199 So. 640 (1940).
4' Steiner v. U.S., 134 F. 2d 931 (C.A. 5th, 1943).
4489 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass., 1950).
45 Ibid., at 358.
4058 Am. Jur., Witness § 463 (1948).
40
41

